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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW-LIFE SENTENCE WITH-
OUT PAROLE IMPOSED ON RECIDIVIST GUILTY OF SEVEN 
NON-VIOLENT CRIMES CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNU-
SUAL PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
PROPORTIONALITY TEST- Solem v. Helm, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983). 
A criminal defendant was convicted of uttering a bad check.' 
Prior to this charge the defendant had been convicted of six separate 
non-violent felonies.2 The defendant was sentenced to life imprison-
ment without parole under the state recidivist statute.3 The Supreme 
Court of South Dakota affirmed the trial court.4 After two years of 
imprisonment the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in federal 
district court where it was denied.5 On appeal, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding the sentence grossly 
disproportionate to the nature of the offense.6 The Supreme Court af-
firmed in a close decision, holding that the sentence was significantly 
disproportionate to the offense committed and therefore violated the 
eighth amendment. 7 
The eighth amendment concept of proportionality is an estab-
lished principle that originates from the rights and privileges accorded 
English citizens at common law.8 Fines were proJ'ortioned to the of-
fense as early as the writing of the Magna Carta. Later, the concept 
was expanded to include bails and punishments in the English Bill of 
Rights. 10 The language in the eighth amendment mirrors that found in 
the English Bill of Rights, evidencing the framers' intent that the same 
rights enjoyed by English citizens be granted to United States 
l. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-41-1.2 
(1979). Under normal circumstances the statute authorizes five years imprison-
ment and up to a $5,000 fine. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 
1983). 
2. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3004. He had been convicted three times for third degree 
burglary, once for obtaining money by false pretenses, once for grand larceny, 
and once for third offense driving while intoxicated. 
3. ld at 3005-06. "When a defendant has been convicted of at least three prior 
convictions in addition to the principal felony, the sentence for the principal fel-
ony shall be enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony." /d (citing S.D. CoDI-
FIED LAWS ANN.§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981) codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
ANN. § 22-7-8 (1983)). The sentence for a class one felony is life ~prisonment. 
S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 22-6-1 (1979 and Supp. 1980). Additionally, "a person 
sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole .... " S.D. CoDIFIED 
LAWS ANN.§ 24-15-4 (1983). 
4. State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 499 (S.D. 1980). 
5. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3006. 
6. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 1982), affd, Solem v. Hei.m, 103 S. Ct. 
3001 (1983). 
7. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3016 (five to four decision). 
8. ld at 3007 (citing 1 American Archives 700 (4th Series 1837) (Georgia Resolu-
tions, Aug. 10, 1774)). 
9. /d at 3006; Magna Carta, 1215 regnal year, ch. 20-22. 
10. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3007 (citing I W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689)). 
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citizens. 11 
Despite its longstanding tradition, the constitutional requirement 
of proportionality has never been clearly defined by the courts. The 
underlying premise of the concept of proportionality is that crimes and 
their corresponding punishments are directly related to the changing 
standards of society. 12 Trial courts are generally accorded a presump-
tion of correctness in sentencing procedures. Thus, appellate review 
has been limited to determining whether a clear abuse of discretion 
occurred using a subjective "shock the conscience" analysis. 13 If a sen-
tence is found to "shock the conscience," courts generallyl 4 proceed to 
an analysis of the sentence under the more objective proportionality 
standard. 15 
The proportionality issue was raised in O,Netl v. Vermont, 16 an 
1892 Supreme Court case involving the length of sentences. Although 
the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 17 the dissent considered 
whether the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under 
the eighth amendment. 18 The dissent concluded that sentences that are 
excessively long or severe in comparison to the offense charged are un-
constitutionally disproportionate and therefore prohibited by the 
eighth amendment. 19 
The Supreme Court later followed the reasoning of the O,Ne1l dis-
sent by acknowledging the concept of proportionality.20 In addition, 
the Court developed factors to measure sentences so as to prevent the 
imposition of a constitutionally disproportionate sentence.21 The 
II. Id Compare U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII with English Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., 
sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). 
12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (the concept is one that must "draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a mature soci-
ety."); see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see generally Wheeler, 
Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amend-
ment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838 (1972). 
13. See, e.g., Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965) (general prison regu-
latons on mail considered reasonable in a "shock the conscience" test); Workman 
v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968) (laying out an analysis of 
sentences, beginning with the subjective "shock the conscience" test, then pro-
ceeding to an objective proportionality test); State v. Cooper, 304 S.E.2d 851, 857 
(W.Va. 1983) (criminal conviction reversed solely on "shock the conscience" test 
without the court finding it necessary to consider a more objective test). 
14. See State v. Cooper, 304 S.E.2d 851 (W.Va. 1983). 
15. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
16. 144 u.s. 323 (1892). 
17. Id at 334-35. 
18. Id at 339 (Field, J., dissenting). 
19. Id 
20. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
21. Id (considering punishment for same or similar crimes in other parts of United 
States); see also Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983) (considering gravity of 
offense and harshness of penalty, punishment in other jurisdictions and in the 
same jurisdiction); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (considered punish-
ment in other jurisdictions for same or similar crimes, the gravity of the offense 
and the harshness of the penalty). The Court, in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 
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Supreme Court first applied a proportionality test to determine the con-
stitutionality of a sentence in 1910.22 In Weems v. United States/3 a 
government official was convicted of falsifying a public document. He 
was sentenced to cadena temporal, a penalty that carried a minimum 
twelve year imprisonment and also mandated, inter alia, that the de-
fendant, upon release, would remain under the court's supervision for 
the rest of his life.24 The Weems Court concluded that lifetime supervi-
sion was an attendant penalty which deprived the official of essential 
liberties.25 Although Weems did not expressly set forth criteria against 
which to measure a sentence, the Court's analysis considered three ma-
jor areas in invalidating the statute. Implicit in its decision is the con-
sideration of the sentence through a "shock the conscience" 
perspective.26 Specifically, the Court objectively compared the sen-
tence both against those penalties imposed for the same or more severe 
offenses in other jurisdictions27 and against similar penalties in the 
same jurisdiction.28 In evaluating both of these factors, the Court 
found that cadena temporal constituted cruel and unusual punishment 
under the eighth amendment29 because it was disproportionate to the 
offense charged.30 
Between 1910 and 1958 the Supreme Court did not rule on the 
issue of proportionality.31 In 1958, the Supreme Court considered a 
(1892), focused primarily on the severity of the punishment in its dissent. Perhaps 
in recognition of the potentially subjective nature of the abstract concept of sever-
ity, both state and federal courts have expanded the concept and based their pro-
portionality analysis on a comparison between the specific crime and sentence at 
issue and other similar crimes and sentences. See, e.g., MD. CoDE ANN. art. 27, 
§ 414(e)(4) (1978); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1983). 
22. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see Wheeler, supra note 12, at 857-
58. 
23. 217 u.s. 349 (1910). 
24. Id at 366. 
Id 
Its minimum degree is confinement in a penal institution for twelve 
years and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard 
and painful labor, no assistance from friend or relative, no marital au-
thority or parental rights or rights of property, no participation even in 
the family council ... forever kept within voice and view of the crimi-
nal magistrate, not being able to change his domicile without giving no-
tice to [authority] and without permission in writing. 
25. /d at 366-67. 
26. ld at 380-82. Weems is factually unique. The Court was considering a sentence 
which comported with traditional Philipino laws. The United States, however, 
was at the time in control of the nation and so applied United States constitutional 
law. The dissimilarities in the social values of each nation were obviously in 
conflict. 
27. Id at 380. 
28. Id at 380-81. 
29. Id at 381. 
30. Id at 382. 
31. Although mentioned briefly in dictum in District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 
U.S. 617, 627 (1936), the proportionality issue lay dormant, perhaps because the 
Supreme Court believed that Weems should be limited to its facts. Packer, Making 
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case involving an army deserter who was denied a passport on the 
ground that his citizenship was revoked when he was court-martialed.32 
The Court stated that in the abstract, as the death penalty was available 
for desertion, a sentence imposing expatriation could not be considered 
excessive.33 The plurality opinion nonetheless adopted the Weems 
analysis and found the sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate to 
the offense charged.34 In analyzing the sentence, the Court found that 
eighty-two of eighty-four countries in the world did not punish a crime 
by denationalization.35 In addition, expatriation is more destructive of 
the individual's psyche than torture or physical harm.36 Thus, al-
though the Weems proportionality test was not explicitly cited, the 
Court sanctioned the use of the objective two-prong analysis in revers-
ing the defendant's sentence.37 
Although prior to 1980 the Weems proportionality analysis was 
not used to evaluate the constitutionality of the length of a sentence, 
the analysis was refined and repeatedly applied in capital punishment 
cases.38 The application of proportionality analysis to capital punish-
ment cases has been justified on the ground that the death penalty is 
irrevocable, whereas a penalty of imprisonment can be reversed. 39 In 
1982 the Supreme Court further clarified the proportionality analysis in 
Enmund v. Florida 40 by setting forth a s£ectrum of objective areas to 
consider in reviewing the death penalty. 1 In Enmund, the defendant 
was an accessory to an armed robbery which resulted in the victim's 
death.42 The Court compared the penalties imposed for armed robbery 
in other jurisdictions and found that the death penalty was authorized 
for felony murder in only nine of the thirty-six states that authorized 
the use of the death penalty.43 In addition, the Court considered the 
nature and gravity of the offense, finding that the majority of juries, 
the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1071, 1076 (1964). Additionally, 
proportionality was considered rarely applicable to penalties other than capital 
punishment. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1982); Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
32. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1958). 
33. Id at 99. 
34. ld at 101. 
35. Id at 103. 
36. Id at 102-03. 
37. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,327 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring). Con-
Ira Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172 (1975). 
38. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-600 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 187 (1976). 
39. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
40. 458 u.s. 782 (1982). 
41. Id at 788 ("historical development of the punishment at issue, legislative judg-
ments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made ... "; 
paraphrasing the earlier plurality opinion of Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 
(1977)). 
42. Id at 784. 
43. Id at 791-92. 
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when faced with circumstances similar to those in Enmund, rejected the 
death penalty.44 The Enmund Court next considered other sentences 
that had been imposed for felony murder within the same jurisdiction 
and found it significant that all felony murder convicts on death row in 
Florida, except the defendant, had actually committed the murder.45 
The Court emphasized that no valid state interest, such as deterrence of 
killing, was furthered by the imposition of capital punishment, because 
the killing was unintentional.46 In sum, the Court held that the appli-
cation of the death penalty to the defendant constituted an unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate sentence because the defendant lacked the 
requisite intent to kill and had not actually committed the murde ·.47 
Although lower courts have sanctioned the use of a proportion.tlity 
analysis to non-capital sentences,48 the Supreme Court severely re-
stricted this approach in 1980.49 In Rummel v. Estel/e,50 the defendant 
was sentenced to life imprisonment under a recidivist statute after in-
curring three felony convictions - once for fraudulently using a credit 
card, once for passing a forged check, and once for false pretenses.51 
The Rummel Court accorded great deference to the state's legislative 
authority to enact mandatory sentences. 52 The Court found that the 
state's liberal parole policy was an important variable to consider when 
evaluating the defendant's sentence.5 In addition, the Court held that 
the state had a valid interest in increasing sentences of those who are 
demonstrably "incapable of conforming to the norms of society as es-
tablished by its criminallaw."54 Moreover, the Court emphasized that 
only rarely would sentences be invalidated solely because of their 
44. Id at 794. 
45. ld at 795. 
46. /d at 797-99. 
47. Id at 801. 
48. See Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 415 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that imposition 
of maximum sentence for narcotics violations is not unconstitutionally dispropor-
tionate); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 143 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that sentence 
imposed on an habitual offender was unconstitutionally disproportionate under 
a four-prong test very similar to that later used in Enmund); Wanstreet v. 
Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205, 214 (W.Va. 1981) (enhanced penalty authorized 
under the state recidivist statute held disproportionate to the connected offenses). 
Apparently state courts have traditionally accorded their citizens broader protec-
tions than those extended under the eighth amendment. ld 
49. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Indicative of the lack of unanimity re-
garding the appropriate use of the proportionality analysis is the fact that the 
Rummel majority becomes the Solem dissent. The Rummel majority suggests that 
instances might arise where the test would apply, id at 274 n.ll, but only Justice 
Blackmun is convinced to join the dissenters in Rummel and find that the time is 
at hand, in Solem, to apply the test. 
50. ld 
51. Id at 265-66. 
52. ld at 274-75, 284. 
53. ld at 280-81. 
54. ld at 276, 280-81. 
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length. 55 The Rummel decision implied that the eighth amendment did 
not authorize courts to review sentences of imprisonment and that the 
determination of sentence lengths was entirely within the perogative of 
the legislature. 56 
Three years later the Supreme Court departed from its position 
that proportionality review was unavailable for sentence terms. In So-
lem v. Helm, 51 the Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment with-
out parole, imposed on an habitual offender who was guilty of seven 
non-violent crimes, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under 
the eighth amendment. 58 In applying a proportionality analysis, the 
Solem Court adopted the criteria set forth in Enmund 59 The Court 
initially evaluated the gravity of the offense and harshness of the pen-
alty. It then compared the life sentence with sentences imposed for 
other crimes within the same jurisdiction and finally contrasted the sen-
tence in Solem with sentences imposed for the same crime in other 
jurisdictions. 60 
In reviewing the gravity of the offense, the Court found that the 
most recent crime committed by the defendant was passive and did not 
involve violence.61 Although it acknowledged the legitimacy of a state 
interest in imposing harsher sentences on habitual offenders, the Court 
emphasized the non-violent nature of each of the defendant's convic-
tions.62 In reviewing the severity of the penalty, the Court determined 
that the death penalty was not statutorily authorized at the time of the 
defendant's conviction; hence, life without parole was the most severe 
penalty that the state could impose. 63 
The Solem Court then reviewed the statutorily authorized 
sentences for felonies committed within the same state. Only a convic-
tion for murder, repeated treason, second-degree manslaughter, first-
degree arson or kidnapping warranted mandatory life sentences.64 In 
addition, a life sentence could be imposed under the recidivist statute 
and for second or third convictions of attempted murder, placement of 
explosives on an airplane, or first-degree rape. The Court noted that 
the statutory penalty for several violent and serious crimes, such as ag-
gravated assault, was a term of years with parole.65 Thus, the Court 
concluded that the defendant's sentence was equal to or greater than 
the sentences imposed for more heinous crimes and therefore dispro-
55. ld at 272. 
56. /d at 274. 
57. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). 
58. ld at 3016. 
59. ld at 3011. 
60. ld 
61. Id at 3012-13. 
62. ld 
63. ld at 3013. 
64. ld 
65. Id at 3014. 
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portionate to his offense.66 
In applying the third criterion, the Solem Court found that the 
sentence was disproportionate to those sentences imposed on recidivists 
in other jurisdictions because only one other state permitted the impo-
sition of life without parole for habitual offenders.67 Based on its find-
ing that the sentence failed to satisfy each prong of the trifurcated test, 
the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision and granted the de-
fendant habeas corpus relief, provided the state did not resentence 
hi 68 m. 
In a departure from the traditional view that courts should defer to 
legislative determinations of sentence lengths,69 Solem indicates that 
the Supreme Court will subject egregious sentences to proportionality 
review. The dissent criticized the majority for departing from prece-
dent, citing Rummel for the proposition that prescribing sentences is 
within the prerogative of the legislature and therefore unreviewable in 
most instances.70 The majority, however, did not attempt to limit the 
legislature's control over the regulation of sentences and penalties. In-
stead, the majority expanded the Rummel proposition by ruling that 
legislative control does not preclude constitutional review.71 As indi-
cated by Rummel and Solem, all sentences are potentially reviewable 
under a "shock the conscience" test.72 Solem, however, suggests that 
only certain sentences will be reviewed under the proportionality anal-
ysis. Whereas the Rummel sentence was reviewed but held to be out of 
the Court's purview, the exclusion of parole in Solem crossed the 
threshold "shock the conscience" test, thus rendering the sentence sub-
ject to Supreme Court proportionality review.73 
The Solem decision highlights the absence of a clear approach in 
applying proportionality to the review of sentence lengths. The dissent 
validly objected to the majority's failure to establish guidelines for sen-
tence review.74 Indeed, although the decision ends speculation in the 
scenario presented in Solem, there are many questions left open for 
further contemplation by the Court.75 Yet the decision will not result 
66. Id 
67. Id 
68. Id at 3006. 
69. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 406-
10 (2d Cir. 1978). 
70. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3018 (1983) (Burger, C. J., dissenting). 
71. Id at 3009-10. 
72. See supra note 13. 
73. Compare Rummel, 445 U.S. at 263 (Court considered the constitutional challenge 
to the recidivist statute but affirmed the state verdict) with Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 
3001 (Court considered the constitutional challenge to the applied sentence and 
reversed it as going beyond appropriate constitutional boundaries). 
74. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3002 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
75. For example, the Court does not address the issue of sentences for a set term of 
years which appear unconscionably long when compared with the severity of the 
crime. In addition, it is conceivable that any sentence that is mechanically im-
184 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
in a substantial increase of litigation as the dissenters predicted.76 It is 
clear that after Solem the sentence must still "shock the conscience" to 
reach the Supreme Court. In addition, the recent decision of Pulley v. 
Harris71 indicates that a sentence will be reviewed for proportionality 
only when its imposition is deemed arbitrary and capricious. 78 Thus, 
although sentences such as the death penalty and life without parole in 
extreme circumstances will be reviewed, Rummel and Pulley emphasize 
that the Court will be disinclined to overturn statutorily authorized 
sentences. 
Contrary to the dissent's claim that the Solem decision violates 
principles of federalism by permitting indirect federal intervention in 
state sentencing procedures,79 the majority decision furthers the intent 
of the framers of the Constitution to protect individual rights. The de-
cision accomplishes this by expanding the scope of judicial review of 
sentencing, while preserving the state's authority to regulate sentencing 
as long as legislative safeguards exist. One important factor in deter-
mining whether the Court will intervene and conduct a proportionality 
review is the degree to which an extreme sentence is mechanically im-
posed without any consideration of mitigating or aggravating circum-
stances. The statutory provision involved in Solem contained no 
legislative safeguards and consequently the decision was subject to ju-
dicial review.80 South Dakota's sentencing scheme mandated an auto-
matic life sentence without parole for all habitual offenders. Unlike 
Solem, the California capital sentencing provisions upheld in Pulley 81 
require the existence of special aggravating circumstances before the 
penalty may be imposed.82 The Maryland repeat offender statute83 
does not violate the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Solem proportionality analysis. Similar 
posed for a term of years, regardless of any extraneous circumstances, might also 
fall within the analysis framed by Solem. 
76. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3022 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). 
77. 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984). 
78. /d. at 879-81. One factor that appeared to influence the Court's decision in Solem 
that the statutorily authorized sentence exceeded constitutional limits was that pe-
nal objectives of rehabilitation, attained by means of a parole system, would be 
disserved. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3015; see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 
248 (1949) (stating that one of the primary goals of the criminal justice system is 
rehabilitation). The Court found untenable the suggestion that even though reha-
bilitated, the only remedy open to the defendant in Solem was commutation of the 
sentence by the governor. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3015-16. South Dakota's commu-
tation policy is very stringent. Where granted, it only allows a prisoner to be 
eligible for parole. Moreover, the governor enjoys unfettered discretion over the 
decision; there can be no definite expectation of commutation. Indeed, "the best 
indication [the Court had] for Helm's chance for commutation is the fact that his 
request already [had] been denied." /d. at 3016 n.29. 
79. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3019 (1983) (Burger, C. J., dissenting). 
80. See supra note 3. 
81. Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 881 (1984). 
82. /d. at 881. 
83. Mo. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 643B (1982 & Supp. 1983). 
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to the South Dakota provision involved in Solem, the Maryland statute 
provides that any habitual offender who has been convicted of three 
separate crimes, and has served time for each, will automatically be 
sentenced to life without parole on the conviction of a fourth violent 
crime.84 Unlike the South Dakota statute, however, the Maryland stat-
ute requires the additional consideration of the aggravating factor of 
violence. 85 
The Court, in Solem, broadened the applicability of the three-
prong proportionality test used for review of death penalties by ex-
tending it to a sentence of life without parole. The second and third 
prongs of this test, which compare the sentence against penalties im-
posed in the same and other jurisdictions, provide an objective evalua-
tion of the constitutionality of a sentence. The dissent criticized the 
subjectivity of the proportionality analysis, 86 perhaps because the first 
criterion, evaluation of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of 
the penalty, is not specifically delineated. The clear standard provided 
in the second and third criteria, however, provides a balance to the 
overall test. 
As a result of Solem, state legislatures and courts will be well-ad-
vised to consider the proportionality of the sentence imposed to the 
offense charged, not only when imposing the death penalty, but also 
when imposing a sentence for an extreme term of years, such as life 
without parole. The Supreme Court will continue to apply the propor-
tionality test in cases that "shock the conscience." Although legislative 
sentencing enactments will remain presumptively valid, the Solem deci-
sion has eroded the almost unfettered deference these laws previously 
have been accorded. 
Elizabeth Gilbert Osterman 
84. ld § 643B(b) (1982 & Supp. 1983). 
85. ld Compare MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 643B(b) (1982 & Supp. 1983), with stat-
utes cited supra note 3. 
86. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3017, 3023-24 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). 
